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THE ROLE OF MODERN ARBITRATION IN THE PROGRESSIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA LAW
DAVID S. STERN*
and
HENRY T. TROETSCHEL, JR.**
Florida's present Arbitration.Act was first passed in 1828.' A typical
statute of the nineteenth century variety, it contains the strengths and
weaknesses that those enactments shared.
Usually these statutes attempted to give strength to a weak, neglected
creature of the common law - arbitration. Common law arbitration was a
perilous procedure indeed. Either party to the submission agreement could
by notice or action withdraw at any time, 2 leaving the other party with a
mere action for damages. Such actions were distinguished by their failure
to gain adequate relief for what the party had lost.3
Attacked by courts which feared a loss of jurisdiction, unused by
lawyers who mistakenly perceived it to be identical with lost fees, arbitration
needed statutory medicine. 4
Nineteenth century statutes usually provided that once a dispute had
arisen the parties could submit this dispute to arbitration, and that such
submission agreement would be irrevocable.-" With one exception courts
*B.S., 1939, LL.B., 1947, Harvard University; LL.M., 1949, New York University;
Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami; Member New York and Florida Bars.
"A.B.; 1946, LL.B., 1952, University of Miami; Graduate Fellow, Yale University
School of Law; Member Florida Bar.
Editor's Note: This paper suggetss a need for a modern arbitration statute for
Florida and describes how the statute proposed for passage by the Florida legislature
would fill that need. Full discussion of any particular phase of arbitration is far beyond
its scope.
The authors wish to acknowledge their debt to Richard B. Thomas, student in the
University of Miami Law School, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 57.01-57.07 (1951).
2. Vynier's Case, 8 Coke 81b, 77 FEng. Reprint 597, 3 Eng. Rul. Case 371 (1809);
People v. Nash, 111 N.Y. 310, 18 N.E. 630 (1888).
3. Wynne v. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co., 179 N.C. 320, 102 S.E. 403 (1920).
4. For discussion see Park Coast. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, Carver
County, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941). "Arbitration can serve as a flexible
and expeditious process, . . . 'free from the myriad technicalities which beset and protract
legislation' . . . for deciding controverted claims. BUT, the arbitral process is liable to
judicial review at many different points, from the agreement right through the hearing
and award. If a party becomes recalcitrant as to the performance of his agreement to
arbitrate, or if he feels aggrieved by the arbitrator or the opposing party during the course
of the arbitral proceedings, or with respect to the award rendered, his cause is likely to
find its way to lawyers and to the courts. Courts and legislatures are currently dealing
with many of these matters and are making the law which governs the process. As a
consequence, parties, lawyers and arbitrators are well advised to take account of these
legal controls in planning for, and in undertaking the use and practice of, arbitration."
WESLEY A. STURCES, CASES ON ARBITRATION, to be published shortly by M. Bender & Co.
5. FLA. STAT. § 57.01 (1951); Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917).
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have interpreted these statutes to give parties a second method of arbitra.
tion, the common law method existing side by side with that of the
statute.
Saved from a lingering demise by this statutory help, arbitration found
convalescence a wearing time. Courts and attorneys had not lost their
common law antipathy, and judges frequently found omission or mistake
in the parties' use of the statutory method.7 Such omission, etc., meant
that at best the arbitration in issue would be a mere common law one
with revocability and the necessity of suit to obtain judgment on the award.8
Occasionally at common law future dispute clauses were permitted.0
Parties who in their original contract had agreed to submit to arbitration
controversies arising under the contract could do so. Such future dispute
clauses were not permitted under the nineteenth century variety statutes. 10
These clauses did not have an easy time at common law, however, and
some of the noblest legal literature defending the rights of people to
courts was devoted to attacking such clauses."'
Obviously, however, arbitration was doomed to perpetual mediocrity
unless this phase of its potential, the handling of future disputes, was per-
mitted to develop. In 1920 the legislature of the State of New York,
influenced by the commercial and business interests of the state, passed the
first of the modern acts.' 2 Since then our once weak patient has gained
bountiful health within that state. Legislative validation of future disputes
clauses has brought modern arbitration to fruition. Today such clauses are
commonplace in commercial contracts, both national and international.
The forthcoming establishment of an Inter-American trade center at
Miami has pointed up the need of a modem act for Florida. International
traders use future disputes clauses constantly; yet the present Florida statute
does not provide for them. International traders might find the advantages
of a Florida trade center not too inviting if forced to use the legal machinery
of other jurisdictions to dispose of or settle disputes arising out of their
contracts.
The draft of the Arbitration Act for Florida herein discussed embodies
the best features of the modern acts.' Parties may, by a written submission
agreement or by a future disputes clause, agree to arbitrate present or future
disputes. The dispute need not be of a justiciable character for a valid
6. The Washington statute was held to abolish common law arbitration, State ex rel
Fancher v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927).
7. E.g., Franks v. Battles, 147 Ark. 169, 227 S.W. 32 (1921).
8. But see discussion in Park Const. Co. v. Independent School Dist., supra note 4.
9. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); Williams v.
Branning Mfg. Co., 153 N.C. 7, 68 S.E. 902 (1910).
10. Myers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio St. 101, 57 N.E. 1089 (1900); Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
v. Standard, 56 Ohio St. 224, 46 N.E. 577 (1897).
11. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Standard, 56 Ohio St. 224, 46 N.E. 577 (1897).
12. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 84. This act has now been passed in 13 other states.
13. The New York Act was the first of the modern acts and has served as a model
for latter ones. Citations will be made to that act as occasion demands.
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arbitration.' 4 Labor agreements are specifically included within the terms
of the Act: Power is reserved to the parties to specifically provide that
their arbitration agreement be not subject to the statute, thereby preserving
their right to common law arbitration. The making of a provision or
submission for arbitration is deemed a consent to the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts to enforce the agreement or to enter judgment on an award
thereon.15
If a dispute arises, arbitration may be initiated by the party demanding
arbitration under the statute by serving (personally or by registered mail)
a written notice on the other party. Such notice must state that unless
within ten days after service the party served shall serve a notice of motion
to stay the arbitration, he shall be thereafter barred from putting in issue
the existence or validity of the agreement or the failure to comply therewith.,
The court may, upon the parties' application, do what is necessary to pre-
serve property or to secure satisfaction of the award.
Normally, of course, the parties would proceed without court inter-
vention to arbitration. If one party is recalcitrant, however, the other may
seek court aid by applying for an order to proceed to arbitration. Ten days
notice of such application shall be served upon the recalcitrant party. A
hearing on the motion is held; if the court is then satisfied that there is
no substantial issue regarding the existence or validity of the agreement to
arbitrate, the court will make an order directing the parties to proceed."7
If, however, a substantial issue is raised as to the existence or validity
of the agreement, the court shall proceed to trial on the issue. Either party
has the right to demand jury trial of this issue but such demand must be
made before the return day of the motion to proceed or in the application
for a motion to stay arbitration.' Note that the recalcitrant party has two
opportunities to raise questions concerning the existence or validity of the
agreement: he may raise the question by a motion to stay arbitration or by
contesting a motion to compel arbitration. He has the right of jury trial
on these issues. His failure to exercise the rights at an appropriate time, of
course, bars him from raising these questions later in the proceedings.
Assuming that the order to proceed has issued, we move to the next
step, the arbitral proceedings. The arbitrators have been appointed perhaps
by the court, (1) if the agreement did not provide a method of appointment,
or (2) if the parties had not appointed them within the time prescribed,
or (3) if an arbitrator had failed or was unable to act, or (4) if the parties
chose two who were to choose a third and the two were unable to agree
on the third. These court appointments must be made on motion, of course,
14. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 1448; Matter of Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 143
N.E. 248 (1924).
15. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 59 F.2d 1038, cert, denied
287 U.S. 622 (1932).
16. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1458(2).
17. Id. § 1450.
18. Id. § 1458(2).
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with proper notice being given to the other parties. If the agreement is
silent as to the number of arbitrators, the court appoints three. Court
appointed arbitrators have the same power as those appointed under the
agreement. 19
Among the powers of arbitrators are the following: (1) to appoint
a time and place for hearing and notify the parties; (2) to adjourn the hear-
ing from time to time; (3) to postpone the hearing but not beyond the
date fixed for making the award; (4) to proceed ex parte if any party neglects
to appear after being given reasonable notice of the time and place of the
hearing; (5) to require any person to attend as a witness and to bring with
him any book, record, document or other evidence. Subpoenae, when issued,
are signed by the arbitrators or a majority of them, and are directed to the
person and served in the same manner as subpoenae to testify before a
court of record. Upon petition of the majority of the arbitrators, the court
may by its contempt power compel attendance of those persons who fail to
obey the subpoenae.2
If, after the commencement of the first meeting and before final award,
an arbitrator for any reason fails to act as such, a majority of the remaining
arbitrators, if there be more than one, may determine any question and
render a final award. The parties may, of course, under the terms of the
agreement or by petition to the court, have replacements appointed.
During the course of the hearing, the arbitrators may subpoena wit-
nesses and admit depositions taken upon proper legal grounds. The conduct
of the hearing is governed by allowing a party to apply for an order to
vacate the award specifying the particular breach of proper conduct in his
motion, from the grounds listed in the statute. 21 The award must be in
writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators, and immediately upon
its rendition, a true copy of the award must be transmitted to each of the
parties or their attorneys.
22
In many cases, the time within which the award shall be made is fixed
in the arbitration agreement. If the time has not been fixed, it must be
made within a reasonable time after the close of the proceedings. The
court in its order directing the arbitrators to proceed promptly may set the
time deemed to be reasonable. Awards rendered after the reasonable time
have no legal effect, unless, of course, the parties in writing agree to extend
the time or to ratify the award.23
Though the validity of an award is not affected by the fact that no
motion is made to confirm it, such a motion may be made by any party
within one year after the award is made. Five days written notice must be
19. Compare id, §§ 1452, 1453.
20. See id. § 1456.
21. Infra note 24.
22. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 1460.
23. Id. § 1461.
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served on the adverse party or his attorney. The court must grant this
motion unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected.
A party wishing to have the award vacated, modified or corrected, may
make such a motion and serve notice within three months after a copy of
the award has been received by the party or his attorney.2 4
The grounds for vacating the award are as follows: (a) Where the
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (b) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of them;
(c) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior, by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (d) where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a final and de-
finite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; (e) if there
was no valid submission or arbitration agreement and the proceeding was
instituted without either serving a notice of intention to arbitrate, as pro-
vided in Section 7, or without serving a motion to compel arbitration, as
provided in Section 4, paragraph 2.25
The grounds for modification or correction are as follows: (a) Where
there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (b)
where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them
not affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; (c) where
the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy.20
If the court vacates the award it may, in its discretion, direct a rehear-
ing before the same arbitrators or new ones, the original agreement governing
selection and time of award.
Upon the granting of an order, confirming, modifying, correcting or
vacating an award, judgment or decree must be entered in conformity there-
with. The judgment may be docketed and has the same effect as a judg-
ment or decree in action or special proceeding. It may be enforced as if
it had been rendered in an action in a court in which it has been entered.2 7
Appeals may be taken from any final order or from a judgment entered
upon an award or from an order or judgment in any action or special pro-
ceeding.28
Note that though the Act provides for speedy, efficient enforcement
of both arbitration agreements and awards, the rights of all parties are fully
preserved. Notice and hearing and trial by jury are carefully spelled out.
24. Id. § 1463.
25. Id. § 1462.
26. Id. § 1463.
27. Id. § 1464.
28. Id. § 1467.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Modem arbitration statutes have been declared constitutional wherever
enacted .21
The passage of a modem arbitration statute such as the one described
herein would greatly aid in the overall industrial growth of Florida through
a more efficient functioning of the proposed Inter-American center and
through the rapid settlement of labor disputes and other important highly
technical matters more adequately handled in this fashion. It is hoped that
all Florida, the general public, and the bench and bar will soon participate in
the benefits accompanying such statutes.
29. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1931) (federal statute); Finsilver,
Still & Mess v. Goldberg M. & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930) (New York
statute).
